

Comments on Session 2.1: Spending Better

John Beirne, Principal Economist, Asian Development Bank

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General comments for all presenters

• Managing fiscal consolidation in a scenario of amplified fiscal risks

> May call for state-dependent guidelines for applying fiscal rules?

• Raising tax revenue and mobilizing domestic financial resources


> What role for regional financial cooperation?

> How can governments garner public support for carbon taxes?

• Optimal design of medium-term fiscal frameworks is challenging:

- > Credible macro assumptions needed in conjunction with a well-anchored fiscal path;
- ➤ Alignment of framework with annual budgets;
- ➤Co-ordination with monetary policy is key: fiscal multipliers and (r-g) dynamics;
- Fiscal institutions need to be strengthened to underpin transparency and accountability, and financial market implications;
- Debt restructuring necessary in many cases (towards capital expenditure/sustainable infrastructure).

Context (1): Recent stabilization in debt levels and improved fiscal positions, but risks persist



FSM = Federated States of Micronesia, Lao PDR = Lao People's Democratic Republic, PNG = Papua New Guinea,

PRC = People's Republic of China

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook

Context (2): Fiscal governance in Asian economies

Fiscal rules in ADB member countries (ratio to GDP)

Member	Debt	Budget Balance	Expenditure	Revenue	Legal Basis
Armenia	60%				
Australia	\checkmark	\checkmark	2% annual cap	\checkmark	
Georgia	60%	3%	30% of GDP*		\checkmark
Hong Kong, China		\checkmark			\checkmark
India		3%			\checkmark
Indonesia	60%	3%			
Japan		\checkmark	\checkmark		\checkmark
Malaysia	55%	3%** Golden Rule			\checkmark
Maldives	60%	3.5%			\checkmark
Mongolia	40%	2%	\checkmark		\checkmark
Pakistan	60% (until FY2018) 50% (after FY2018)	4% (FY2020) 3.5% (after FY2020)			\checkmark
Singapore		\checkmark	\checkmark		$\sqrt{(Constitution)}$
Sri Lanka	85% (until 2019) 60% (from 2020)	5%			

Medium-term Expenditure Framework

Country	Legal Basis	Length of Ceilings	Frequency of Ceiling Revision
Indonesia	\checkmark	4 years	Annually
Korea, Republic of	\checkmark	5 years	Annually
Malaysia		3 years	Annually
Myanmar		3 years	Annually
Philippines		6 years or more	Annually
Singapore		5 years	Every 5 years
Thailand	\checkmark	3 years	Annually
Viet Nam		3 years	Annually
Australia		4 years	More than once per year
Japan		3 years	Not revised
New Zealand		4 years	Annually

FY = fiscal year, GDP = gross domestic product.

Notes:

* For Georgia, 30% of GDP is applied to the expenditure in nonfinancial assets.

** For Malaysia, the International Monetary Fund does not consider this 3% rule a fiscal rule because there are no formal sanctions even if the government does not follow the rule.

Sources: Lledó et al. (2017), Kim et al. (2020).

Questions to each presenter (1)

Roel Beetsma

- What key elements can developing economies adopt from the proposed new fiscal framework outlined (desirability v. feasibility)?
- What mechanisms can support the mainstreaming of fiscal risks in the budgetary and medium-term fiscal framework?
- Better spending could be achieved through **boosting fiscal multipliers**, such as on leveraging private investment. What are the main related challenges faced by developing economies?

• Jón R. Blöndal

- What are the options for optimally using fiscal revenues generated by carbon taxes (as well as emission trading schemes), including accelerating the transition through incentives, subsidies, and public investment?
- > Mechanisms for **prioritizing expenditure options**?
- > What are your thoughts on the **scope for AI** in enhancing spending efficiency. Any risks?

Questions to each presenter (2)

• Sailendra Pattanayak

- How can fiscal policy smoothly transition to its more fundamental role and away from crisis mode? High real interest rates in many Asian economies may be a hurdle?
- What fiscal risks do you see as most pertinent for Asian economies? Thoughts on "green fiscal rules"?
- What can be done to mitigate negative feedback loops in the proposed framework, e.g. the materialization of fiscal risks triggering spending inefficiency?
- Capacity constraints in many developing economies may hamper the implementation and evaluation of "better spending" practices and monitoring of fiscal risks. What are the interim solutions?