



20 か国財務大臣・中央銀行総裁会議声明（仮訳）
（2019年6月8-9日 於：福岡）

1. 世界経済の成長は、足元で安定化の兆しを示しており、総じて、本年後半及び2020年に向けて、緩やかに上向き見通しである。この回復は、緩和的な金融環境が継続すること、幾つかの国々で景気刺激策の効果が発現すること、一時的要因が解消することによってもたらされている。しかしながら、成長は低位であり続けており、リスクは依然として下方に傾いている。何よりも、貿易と地政を巡る緊張は増大してきた。我々は、これらのリスクに対処し続けるとともに、更なる行動をとる用意がある。
2. 我々は、強固で持続性があり均衡のとれた包摂的な成長を実現するため、また、信頼を高める対話と行動を強化することにより、下方リスクから守るために全ての政策手段を用いると我々のコミットメントを再確認する。必要に応じて財政バッファーを再構築し、かつ、公的債務が持続可能な道筋にあることを確保しつつも、財政政策は、機動的に実施し、成長に配慮したものとすべきである。金融政策は、中央銀行のマンデートと整合的な形で、インフレが目標に向けた軌道を維持するか目標付近で安定することを確保すべきである。中央銀行の決定は引き続きよくコミュニケーションがとられる必要がある。構造改革の実行を続けることは、我々の潜在成長力を高める。我々は、国際的な貿易及び投資が、成長、生産性、イノベーション、雇用創出及び開発のための重要なエンジンであることを改めて強調する。我々は、ブエノスアイレス・サミットでの貿易に関する首脳の合意を再確認する。我々は、国際的な協力及び枠組みを強化するために、引き続き共同行動をとる。我々はまた、2018年3月に行った我々の為替相場のコミットメントを再確認する。
3. 世界金融危機の後、グローバル・インバランス（経常収支不均衡）は、新興国や開発途上国を中心に減少し、次第に先進国に集中してきた。しかしながら、不均衡は依然として高水準かつ持続的であり、対外資産・負債の水準も拡大を続けている。我々は、対外収支を評価するにあたっては、サービス貿易・所得収支を含む経常収支のすべての構成要素に着目する必要があることに留意する。我々は、対外収支には、景気循環要因、国内政策及び経済のファンダメンタルズ、海外からの波及効果が複合して反映していることを認識する。我々は、対外不均衡の中には、経済のファンダメンタルズに沿ったものもあれば、過度でありリスクを孕むものもあるという見解を共有する。過度な対外不均衡の根底にある要素には、過剰な法人貯蓄、誤った財政政策、財・サービス分野の貿易障壁が含まれる。我々は、協力推進の精神に基づいた上で、過度の対外不均衡に対処し、強固で持続性があり均衡のとれた包摂的

な成長という G20 の目標実現に対するリスクを低減するには、各国の実情に即しつつ、注意深く策定されたマクロ経済・構造政策が必要であることを確認する。一方で、我々は、外国直接投資などのように、より安定的な資金を提供する形態もあるため、資金調達の構成についても注視すべきことを認識する。我々は、IMF によるグローバル・インバランスに関する更なる分析を期待する。

4. 高齢化を含む人口動態の変化は、G20 すべての国に対して課題と機会をもたらす。我々は、このアジェンダの複雑性に鑑み、人口動態の状況に応じたグループに分かれて、高齢化に関連する包括的議論を行った。人口動態の変化は、財政・金融政策、金融セクター政策、構造改革など広い分野にわたる政策行動を必要とする。

各国は必要に応じ、以下の政策を考慮すべきである。

- スキルへの投資、女性・高齢者における労働参加率の促進、高齢者に優しい産業の育成などによる生産性及び成長の向上。
- 公共支出・投資の効率性や実効性の向上、世代間及び世代内の公平性に考慮した機能的かつ財政持続的な社会保障の強化。
- 高齢化がもたらす課題により良く対応するための公正で成長を促す税制の設計。
- 金融政策に対する高齢化によるインプリケーションのより良い理解。
- 金融機関がそのビジネスモデルとサービスを必要に応じて適応できるよう支援。
- 人口動態変化による国境をまたがるインプリケーションの管理（資本移動や移民など）。

高齢化社会における金融包摂を強化するため、我々は、金融包摂のためのグローバル・パートナーシップ（GPGFI）と OECD が策定した「高齢化と金融包摂のための G20 福岡ポリシー・プライオリティ」を承認する。我々は、「GPGFI 作業計画提案」を承認し、2020 年までのロードマップに基づき、GPGFI がその体制を簡素化することを求める。

5. グローバル金融セーフティ・ネットにおける IMF の中心的役割を維持すべく、我々は、強固で、クォータを基礎とし、かつ、十分な資金基盤を有する IMF にコミットしていることを再確認する。我々は、第 15 次クォーター一般見直しを遅くとも 2019 年年次総会までに完了することに引き続きコミットしており、IMF 資金とガバナンス改革に関する作業を最優先事項として早めることを IMF に求める。我々は、賢人グループの提言のフォローアップ作業の進捗を支持する。我々は、効果的なカントリー・プラットフォームに関するあり得る原則の策定に向けた進展を歓迎し、また、我々の考え方を固めコンセンサスを形成するための更なる作業を期待する。加えて、我々は、新たな標準契約書の作成及び複数の国際開発金融機関（MDBs）との協力合意を含む、多国間投資保証機関による開発金融におけるリスク保険を向上させるために進められている努力を歓迎する。我々は、G20 賢人グループの提言を受け、

4月の代理レベルや昨日の大臣レベルで見られたような、開発金融に係る議論を歓迎する。我々は、資本フローに関する国際機関の取組を歓迎する。OECDは、資本移動自由化コードの見直しを完了し、資本フローの自由化と金融安定を支えるようコードを近代化した。我々はまた、価格に見合った価値に関する国際開発金融機関の報告書を歓迎するとともに、適切で、過剰な負担とならず、かつ明確な利益を生む形での指標の調和化に関する更なる作業を期待する。我々は、賢人グループの提言が複数年にわたる性質のものであることを認識しつつ、その作業を継続する。

6. 我々は、債務の透明性を向上し、債務の持続可能性を確保するための、債務者及び公的・民間の債権者双方による協働の重要性を再確認する。我々は、IMF及び世銀グループによる、新たに生じつつある債務脆弱性に対処するための「様々な角度からのアプローチ」の直近の進捗に関するアップデートを歓迎し、更なる実施を支持する。とりわけ、我々は、IMF及び世銀グループに、債務の記録・監視・報告、債務管理、公的財政管理、国内資金動員の分野における債務者の能力強化のための取組を継続することを求める。我々は、IMF及び世銀グループに、債務上限ポリシー及び非譲許的借入ポリシーの見直しの文脈で、担保付貸付の慣行の分析を引き続き深めることを奨励する。我々は、「G20持続可能な貸付に係る実務指針」の実施に関する任意の自己評価の完了、及びその評価結果と政策提言をまとめたIMF及び世銀グループのノートを歓迎する。我々は、評価を完了したG20及び非G20メンバーを称賛する。我々は、貸付慣行の改善を目指して、このノートで強調されている課題を引き続き議論していく。我々は、民間貸付に係る債務の透明性及び持続可能性を向上させるための、「債務透明性のための任意の原則」に関する国際金融協会の取組を支持し、フォローアップを期待する。我々は、二国間の公的債務を再編するための主要な国際フォーラムとして、債権者たる新興国のより多くの参加に向けてパリクラブが進めている取組を支持する。これに関連して、我々は、パリクラブと協働するために、インドがパリクラブに事案に応じた参加を自発的に決定したことを歓迎する。

7. インフラは経済の成長と繁栄の原動力である。質の高いインフラを強調することは、「投資対象としてのインフラに向けたロードマップ」に沿いインフラ・ギャップの縮小に向けて継続中のG20の努力の必要不可欠な一部である。この文脈で、我々は、公的財政の持続可能性を保つ形での持続可能な成長と開発を達成するためのインフラの正のインパクトの最大化、ライフサイクル・コストでみた経済性の向上、女性の経済的なエンパワーメントを含めた環境・社会配慮の統合、自然災害その他のリスクに対する強靱性の強化、及びインフラ・ガバナンスの強化の重要性を強調する。我々は、この理解に基づき、また、テーマ横断的な協働を歓迎しつつ、我々の共通の戦略的方向性と高い志として、「質の高いインフラ投資に関するG20原則」を承認する。我々は、国際機関に対して、効果的な実施のために有用であろう、質の高いインフラ投資に係るレファレンス・ノート及びファシリティとリソースに係る新

たなデータベースを作成したことを感謝する。我々は、質の高いインフラ投資に係るあり得る指標を探求することを含めて、インフラを投資対象へと育成するための作業項目を引き続き前進させていくことを期待する。

8. 我々は、自然災害に対する財務上の強靱性を促進させる手段としての、災害リスクファイナンス・保険スキームの重要性を認識する。こうしたスキームは、政府が民間部門の資金を効果的に活用し、それによって時宜を得た形で自然災害からの財務上のリスクを管理することに資する。この関連で、世銀からの報告書「災害ショックに対する財務上の強靱性の強化：グッドプラクティスと新たなフロンティア」は、マクロ経済・財政計画の策定を通じたものを含む、災害リスクファイナンスに係る手法に関する知識を広げることに役立つものである。
9. ユニバーサル・ヘルス・カバレッジ（UHC）に向けた前進は、途上国において、人的資源の開発、持続可能で包摂的な成長と開発、パンデミックや薬剤耐性といった公衆衛生上の緊急事態の防止、発見及び対応に貢献する。この観点から、我々は、「途上国における UHC ファイナンス強化の重要性に関する G20 共通理解」へのコミットメントを確認する。「共通理解」文書に示されたとおり、国際機関による活動を基礎とし、民間部門や非政府団体による適切な貢献を伴った、多分野にわたるアプローチ、特に財務当局と保健当局の連携は、保健財政強化のために重要である。この点に関し、我々は首脳サミットに際して開催される財務大臣・保健大臣合同セッションに期待する。我々は、世界銀行グループが作成したレポート「21世紀における持続可能かつ包摂的成長の推進のための優れた保健財政」に感謝する。
10. 我々は「アフリカとのコンパクト（CwA）」への継続した支持を強調する。これには、民間部門の投資家とのより緊密な関与や、二国間の関与の強化が含まれるべきである。後者には、開発金融機関からの一貫した貢献や、CwA を実施する上での役割に対する明確な理解の上に立った、参画する国際機関（WBG、AfDB、IMF）の役割の強化が含まれる。
11. 我々は、世界規模で公正、持続可能かつ現代的な国際課税システムのための協力を継続するとともに、成長志向の租税政策を推進するための国際協力を歓迎する。我々は、G20/OECD「税源浸食と利益移転（BEPS）」パッケージの世界的な実施及び税の安定性向上の重要性を再確認する。我々は、経済の電子化に伴う課税上の課題への対応に関する最近の進捗を歓迎し、BEPS 包摂的枠組みによって策定された、2つの柱からなる野心的な作業計画を承認する。我々は、2020年までの最終報告書によるコンセンサスに基づく解決策のための取組を更に強化する。我々は、税に関する金融口座情報の自動的交換の進捗を含む税の透明性に関する最近の成果を歓迎する。我々はまた、国際的に合意された税の透明性基準を満足に実施していない法域の更新されたリストを歓迎する。我々は、強化されたすべての基準を考慮した、OECDによるリストの更なる更新を期待する。リストに載った法域に対しては、防御的措置が検討

される。この点において、我々は利用可能な措置を列挙した 2015 年の OECD 報告書を想起する。我々は、全ての法域に対し多国間税務行政執行共助条約への署名及び批准を求める。我々は引き続き、「税に関する協働のためのプラットフォーム (PCT)」を通じた協調や、中期歳入戦略に関する経験の活用、能力が限られた国々における国内資金動員を支援する各国の状況に合わせた努力等により、開発途上国における税に関する能力構築支援を支持する。我々は PCT の最初の進捗報告書及び日本における「アジア大洋州租税・金融犯罪調査アカデミー」を歓迎する。

12. 合意された国際基準に基づく、開かれた、強靱な金融システムは、持続可能な成長を支えるために極めて重要である。我々は、合意された金融規制改革の完全、適時かつ整合的な実施に引き続きコミットしている。我々は、これらの規制改革の影響を引き続き評価し、中小企業金融についての FSB の市中協議文書を歓迎する。我々は、金融安定性に対する脆弱性と生じつつあるリスクについて、引き続き注視し、マクロ・プルーデンスの手段を含め、必要に応じ対処する。我々は、ノンバンク金融仲介が金融システムに与える多様性を歓迎する一方、引き続き、関連する金融安定リスクを、適切に特定、注視、対処する。我々は、FSB と証券監督者国際機構 (IOSCO) による市場の分断についての報告書を歓迎し、10 月に、進行中の作業も含めた進捗報告を受けたいことを期待する。我々は、規制・監督上の協力等により、意図せざる、悪影響をもたらす市場の分断に対処する。我々は、コルレス銀行関係の解消の原因及び結果と、銀行サービスへの送金業者のアクセスにかかる課題について、引き続き監視し、対処する。サステナブル・ファイナンスの動員及び金融包摂の強化は、世界の成長にとって重要である。我々は、こうした分野における民間部門の参加と透明性を歓迎する。
13. 暗号資産の基礎となるものを含む技術革新は、金融システム及びより広く経済に重要な便益をもたらし得る。暗号資産は、現時点でグローバル金融システムの安定に脅威をもたらしていないが、我々は、消費者及び投資家保護、マネーロンダリング及びテロ資金供与への対策に関するものを含め、リスクに引き続き警戒を続ける。我々は、マネーロンダリング及びテロ資金供与への対策のため、最近改訂された、仮想資産や関連業者に対する金融活動作業部会 (FATF) 基準を適用するというコミットメントを再確認する。我々は、FATF が今月の会合にて、解釈ノート及びガイダンスを採択することを期待する。我々は、消費者及び投資家保護や市場の健全性に関し、暗号資産取引プラットフォームについての IOSCO の報告書を歓迎する。我々は、FSB の暗号資産当局者台帳や、暗号資産における現在の取組、規制アプローチ、及び潜在的なギャップに関する報告書を歓迎する。我々は、FSB と基準設定主体に対して、リスクを監視し、必要に応じ追加的な多国間での対応にかかる作業を検討することを要請する。我々はまた、分散型金融技術、それが金融安定性や規制、ガバナンスにもたらす潜在的な影響、及び当局が広範なステークホルダーとの対話をどのように強化できるかについての FSB の報告書を歓迎する。我々は、サイバーの強靱性を高める努力を強化し続けるとと

もに、サイバー攻撃への対応や復旧のための効果的な取組を明らかにするFSBのイニシアティブの進捗を歓迎する。

14. 我々は、マネーロンダリング、テロ資金供与及び拡散金融と闘い、これを防止するための国際基準の設定主体としてのFATFの不可欠な役割を強調する国連安保理決議2462号を歓迎する。これらの脅威と闘う努力を強化することについての我々の強いコミットメントを再確認する。我々は、FATF基準の完全、効果的かつ迅速な履行を求める。我々は、今年4月に開催されたFATF大臣会合において、FATFマニデートが恒久化されるとともに、大臣級会合の2年に1度の開催やFATF議長・副議長の任期延長を含めたFATFのガバナンス強化につながる成果が得られたことを歓迎する。我々は、FATFの「戦略的な見直し」に期待する。我々は、金融技術革新がもたらすリスクと機会をモニターし、FATF基準が変化に適応した適切なものであり続けることを確保するとのFATFによるコミットメントを歓迎する。我々は、その進捗を2021年に報告するようFATFに求める。我々は、拡散金融への国際的な対応を強化するためのFATFによる更なる行動を期待する。

1. Global growth appears to be stabilizing, and is generally projected to pick up moderately later this year and into 2020. This recovery is supported by the continuation of accommodative financial conditions, stimulus measures taking effect in some countries, and one-off factors dissipating. However, growth remains low and risks remain tilted to the downside. Most importantly, trade and geopolitical tensions have intensified. We will continue to address these risks, and stand ready to take further action.
2. We reaffirm our commitment to use all policy tools to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth, and safeguard against downside risks, by stepping up our dialogue and actions to enhance confidence. Fiscal policy should be flexible and growth-friendly while rebuilding buffers where needed and ensuring debt as a share of GDP is on a sustainable path. In line with central banks' mandates, monetary policy should ensure that inflation remains on track toward, or stabilizes around targets. Central bank decisions need to remain well communicated. Continued implementation of structural reforms will enhance our growth potential. We reemphasize that international trade and investment are important engines of growth, productivity, innovation, job creation and development. We reaffirm our Leaders' conclusions on trade at the Buenos Aires Summit. We will continue to take joint action to strengthen international cooperation and frameworks. We also reaffirm our exchange rate commitments made in March 2018.
3. Global current account imbalances have narrowed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, notably in emerging and developing economies and they have become increasingly concentrated in advanced economies. However, they remain large and persistent, and stock positions continue to diverge. In assessing external balances, we note the importance of monitoring all components of the current account, including service trade and income balances. We acknowledge that external balances reflect a combination of cyclical factors, domestic policies and fundamentals, as well as spillovers from abroad. We share the view that, while some of the external imbalances may be in line with economic fundamentals, others may be excessive and pose risks. Factors underlying excessive imbalances may include excess corporate savings, miscalibrated fiscal policies, and barriers to trade in goods and services. In the spirit of enhancing cooperation, we affirm that carefully calibrated macroeconomic and structural policies tailored to country-specific circumstances are necessary to address excessive imbalances and mitigate the risks to achieving the G20 goal of strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth. Meanwhile, we recognize that the composition of funding also should be carefully monitored as some forms (such as foreign direct investment) provide more stable funding than others. We look forward to the IMF's further analytical work on global imbalances.
4. Demographic changes, including population aging, pose challenges and opportunities for all G20 members. Given the complex nature of this agenda, we held a comprehensive discussion on aging-related issues at break-out sessions, which grouped countries according to their demographic profiles. Demographic changes will require policy actions that span fiscal, monetary, financial, and structural policies.

In this regard, countries should consider, as relevant:

- Further enhancing productivity and growth, including by investing in skills, and encouraging labor market participation in particular of women and older people and promoting elderly-friendly industries;
- Enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending as well as a well-functioning and fiscally sustainable social safety net with due consideration to intra- and inter-generational equity;

- Designing the tax system in an equitable and growth-friendly manner, so as to better respond to the challenges posed by aging;
- Better understanding the implications of aging for monetary policy;
- Assisting financial institutions to make any needed adjustments to their business models and services;
- Managing the cross-border implications of demographic changes, such as capital and migratory flows.

To strengthen financial inclusion in the aging society, we endorse the *G20 Fukuoka Policy Priorities on Aging and Financial Inclusion*, prepared by the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion (GPII) and OECD. We endorse the *Proposed GPII Work Program*, and ask the GPII to streamline its structure based on the *Roadmap to 2020*.

5. We reaffirm our commitment to a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF, to preserve its role at the center of the global financial safety net. We remain committed to concluding the 15th General Review of Quotas no later than the 2019 Annual Meetings, and call on the IMF to expedite its work on IMF resources and governance reform as a matter of the highest priority. We support the progress made on work to follow up the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) proposals. We welcome the progress made towards developing possible principles for effective country platforms and look forward to further work to consolidate our views and build consensus. In addition, we welcome ongoing efforts by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency to enhance risk insurance in development finance, including the release of new standardized contracts and cooperation agreements with several MDBs. We welcome the discussion of development finance issues, in response to the relevant EPG proposals, as experienced this year at Deputies' level in April and at Ministers' level yesterday. We welcome the work undertaken by the international organizations on capital flows. The OECD has completed a review of its *Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements*, which modernizes the Code to support the liberalization of capital flows and financial stability. We also welcome the MDBs' report on value for money and look forward to further work on indicators where harmonization is relevant, affordable and provides clear benefits. We will continue our work on the EPG's proposals, recognizing their multi-year nature.
6. We reiterate the importance of joint efforts undertaken by both borrowers and creditors, official and private, to improve debt transparency and secure debt sustainability. We welcome an IMF-World Bank Group (WBG) Update on the recent progress of their multi-pronged approach for addressing emerging debt vulnerabilities, and support its further implementation. In particular, we call on the IMF and WBG to continue their efforts to strengthen borrowers' capacity in the areas of debt recording, monitoring, and reporting, debt management, public financial management, and domestic resource mobilization. In the context of the review of the Debt Limits Policy and Non-Concessional Borrowing Policy, we encourage the IMF and WBG to continue their efforts to deepen their analysis of collateralized financing practices. We welcome the completion of the voluntary self-assessment of the implementation of the G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing and the IMF-WBG note on the survey results and policy recommendation. We applaud the G20 and non-G20 members who completed the survey. We will continue to discuss the issues highlighted by this note, aiming to improve financing practices. We support the work of the Institute of International Finance on the *Voluntary Principles for Debt Transparency* to improve debt transparency and sustainability of private financing and look forward to follow up. We support the ongoing work of the Paris Club, as the principal international forum for restructuring official bilateral debt, towards the broader inclusion of emerging creditors. In that regard, we welcome India associating voluntarily with the Paris Club to cooperate in its work on a case-by-case basis.
7. Infrastructure is a driver of economic growth and prosperity. An emphasis on quality infrastructure is an essential part of the G20's ongoing efforts to close the infrastructure gap, in accordance with

the *Roadmap to Infrastructure as an Asset Class*. In this context, we stress the importance of maximizing the positive impact of infrastructure to achieve sustainable growth and development while preserving the sustainability of public finances, raising economic efficiency in view of life-cycle cost, integrating environmental and social considerations, including women's economic empowerment, building resilience against natural disasters and other risks, and strengthening infrastructure governance. Based on this understanding, and welcoming inter-thematic collaborations, we endorse the G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment as our common strategic direction and high aspiration. We thank the international organizations for preparing the Reference Notes on quality infrastructure investment and a new Database of Facilities and Resources, which will help effective implementation. We look forward to continuing advancing the elements to develop infrastructure as an asset class, including by exploring possible indicators on quality infrastructure investment.

8. We acknowledge the importance of disaster risk financing and insurance schemes as a means to promote financial resilience against natural disasters. These schemes can help governments effectively leverage private sector resources and thereby manage financial risks arising from natural disasters in a timely manner. In this regard, the WBG's report, *Boosting Financial Resilience to Disaster Shocks: Good Practices and New Frontiers*, will help broaden knowledge of disaster risk financing methods, including through macro-fiscal planning.
9. Moving towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) contributes to human capital development, sustainable and inclusive growth and development, and prevention, detection and response to health emergencies, such as pandemics and anti-microbial resistance, in developing countries. In this context, we affirm our commitment to the G20 Shared Understanding on the Importance of UHC Financing in Developing Countries. As articulated in the *Shared Understanding* document, a multi-sectoral approach, in particular the collaboration between finance and health authorities, with the appropriate contribution of the private sector and non-government organizations, is crucial for strengthening health financing, building on work by international organizations. In this regard, we look forward to a joint session of Finance and Health Ministers in the margins of the Leaders' Summit. We appreciate the World Bank Group's report, *High-Performance Health Financing for Universal Health Coverage: Driving Sustainable, Inclusive Growth in the 21st Century*.
10. We underline our continued support for the Compact with Africa (CwA). This should involve closer engagement with private sector investors and enhanced bilateral engagement, including coherent contributions from development finance institutions as well as enhanced roles for participating international organizations (WBG, AfDB, IMF) based on a clear understanding of their roles in implementing the CwA.
11. We will continue our cooperation for a globally fair, sustainable, and modern international tax system, and welcome international cooperation to advance pro-growth tax policies. We reaffirm the importance of the worldwide implementation of the G20/OECD Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) package and enhanced tax certainty. We welcome the recent progress on addressing the tax challenges arising from digitalization and endorse the ambitious work program that consists of a two-pillar approach, developed by the Inclusive Framework on BEPS. We will redouble our efforts for a consensus-based solution with a final report by 2020. We welcome the recent achievements on tax transparency, including the progress on automatic exchange of financial account information for tax purposes. We also welcome an updated list of jurisdictions that have not satisfactorily implemented the internationally agreed tax transparency standards. We look forward to a further update by the OECD of the list that takes into account all of the strengthened criteria. Defensive measures will be considered against listed jurisdictions. In this regard, we recall the 2015 OECD report inventorying available measures. We call on all jurisdictions to sign and ratify the multilateral Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters. We continue to support tax capacity building in

developing countries, including coordinating through the Platform for Collaboration on Tax (PCT) and by applying the experience with medium-term revenue strategies and tailoring efforts to support domestic resource mobilization in countries with limited capacities. We welcome the first progress report of the PCT, as well as the Asia-Pacific Academy for Tax and Financial Crime Investigation in Japan.

12. An open and resilient financial system, grounded in agreed international standards, is crucial to support sustainable growth. We remain committed to the full, timely and consistent implementation of the agreed financial reforms. We continue to evaluate their effects and welcome the FSB's public consultation report on SME financing. We will continue to monitor and, as necessary, address vulnerabilities and emerging risks to financial stability, including with macroprudential tools. While non-bank financing provides welcome diversity to the financial system, we will continue to identify, monitor and address related financial stability risks as appropriate. We welcome the reports from the FSB and International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) on market fragmentation, and look forward to receiving progress updates in October including on ongoing work. We will address unintended, negative effects of market fragmentation, including through regulatory and supervisory cooperation. We continue to monitor and address the causes and consequences of the withdrawal of correspondent banking relationships, and issues on remittance firms' access to banking services. Mobilizing sustainable finance and strengthening financial inclusion are important for global growth. We welcome private sector participation and transparency in these areas.
13. Technological innovations, including those underlying crypto-assets, can deliver significant benefits to the financial system and the broader economy. While crypto-assets do not pose a threat to global financial stability at this point, we remain vigilant to risks, including those related to consumer and investor protection, anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism (CFT). We reaffirm our commitment to applying the recently amended FATF Standards to virtual assets and related providers for AML and CFT. We look forward to the adoption of the FATF Interpretive Note and Guidance by the FATF at its plenary later this month. We welcome IOSCO's work on crypto-asset trading platforms related to consumer and investor protection and market integrity. We welcome the FSB's directory of crypto-asset regulators, and its report on work underway, regulatory approaches and potential gaps relating to crypto-assets. We ask the FSB and standard setting bodies to monitor risks and consider work on additional multilateral responses as needed. We also welcome the FSB report on decentralized financial technologies, and the possible implications for financial stability, regulation and governance, and how regulators can enhance the dialogue with a wider group of stakeholders. We also continue to step up efforts to enhance cyber resilience, and welcome progress on the FSB's initiative to identify effective practices for response to and recovery from cyber incidents.
14. We welcome the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2462, which stresses the essential role of the FATF in setting global standards for preventing and combatting money laundering, terrorist financing and proliferation financing. We reiterate our strong commitment to step up efforts to fight these threats. We call for the full, effective and swift implementation of the FATF Standards. We welcome the achievement of the FATF Ministerial Meeting in April this year that has given the FATF an open-ended mandate and led to strengthening the FATF's governance, including the biennial ministerial meeting and the FATF Presidency's term extensions. We look forward to the FATF's Strategic Review. We welcome FATF's commitment to monitor the risks and opportunities of financial innovation, and to ensure the FATF standards remain relevant and responsive. We ask the FATF to report back on progress in 2021. We look forward to further action by the FATF to strengthen the global response to proliferation financing.

Annex

Reports and Documents Received

Global Economy

- G20 Surveillance Note IMF

Global Imbalances

- Summary Document on Global Imbalances FWG
- Global Imbalances IMF

Aging and its Policy Implications

- Summary Document on Aging FWG
- Fiscal challenges and inclusive growth in ageing societies OECD
- Macroeconomics of Aging and Policy Implications IMF
- G20 Fukuoka Policy Priorities on Aging and Financial Inclusion GPFI and OECD
- Proposed GPFI Work Program GPFI

International Financial Architecture

- 2019 Final Report to the Osaka Summit IFA WG
- OECD Revised Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements OECD
- Report on the Revised Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements OECD
- MDBs' final report on value for money AfDB, AsDB, EBRD, EIB, IDBG and WBG

Debt Sustainability and Transparency in Low-Income Countries (LICs)

- The Joint IMF-WB Multipronged Approach for Addressing Emerging Debt Vulnerabilities - Update on the recent progress and key milestones ahead IMF and WBG
- G20 Operational Guidelines for Sustainable Financing Survey Results and Policy Recommendation IMF and WBG
- Voluntary Principles for Debt Transparency IIF

Quality Infrastructure Investment

- G20 Principles for Quality Infrastructure Investment IWG
- MDB Infrastructure Cooperation Platform: project preparation workstream, Phase II reference note on project preparation across the full project cycle EBRD in cooperation with WBG
- Multilateral Development Banks' Reference Note, Translating Quality Infrastructure Investment Principles into Procurement Practice AfDB, AsDB, BSTDB, CDB, CABI, CEB, EIB, EBRD, IADB, and IsDB, coordinated by WBG
- OECD Reference Note on Environmental and Social Considerations in Quality Infrastructure OECD
- OECD/IMF Reference Note on the Governance of Quality Infrastructure Investment OECD and IMF
- GI Hub/OECD/World Bank Database of Resources and Facilities for Quality Infrastructure Investment GI Hub

Resilience against Natural Disasters

- Boosting Financial Resilience to Disaster Shocks: Good Practices and New Frontiers WBG

Strengthening Health Financing for Moving towards Universal Health Coverage (UHC) in Developing Countries

- G20 Shared Understanding on the Importance of UHC Financing in Developing Countries Japanese Presidency
- High-Performance Health Financing for UHC: Driving Sustainable, Inclusive Growth in the 21st Century WBG

Compact with Africa

- Compact with Africa Monitoring Report 2019 WBG in collaboration with AfDB and IMF

International Taxation

- Secretary-General Report to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors OECD
- Programme of Work to Develop a Consensus Solution to the Tax Challenges Arising from the Digitalisation of the Economy Inclusive Framework on BEPS
- 2019 Progress Report on Tax Certainty IMF and OECD
- PCT Progress Report 2018-2019 Platform for Collaboration on Tax (IMF, OECD, UN and WBG)

Financial Regulation

- Chair's letter to G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors FSB
- Progress report on implementation of G20 reforms FSB
- Evaluation of the effects of financial regulatory reforms on small and medium-enterprise financing (SME) - Consultative Document FSB
- Report on Market Fragmentation FSB
- Market Fragmentation and Cross-border Regulation Report IOSCO
- 2019 Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures status report FSB
- Remittance service providers' access to banking services – Monitoring of the FSB's recommendations FSB
- Report to the G20 on the Implementation of the G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance OECD

Financial Innovation

- Decentralised Financial Technologies - Report on financial stability, regulatory and governance implications FSB
- Crypto-assets regulators directory FSB
- Crypto-assets - Work underway, regulatory approaches and potential gaps FSB
- Issues, Risks and Regulatory Considerations Relating to Crypto-Asset Trading Platforms– Consultation Report IOSCO
- Progress report on cyber incident response and recovery FSB

AML/CFT


- FATF President's Letter to the G20 FMCBG FATF

グローバル・インバランス：G20FWGサマリードキュメントの概要

主な内容


- 世界金融危機以降、グローバルな経常収支の不均衡は減少したが、依然として高止まりしている上、対外資産・負債のレベルは更に拡大している。経常収支の不均衡は、高齢化に備えて必要な貯蓄を反映するなど、不均衡そのものが適正な場合もある。しかしながら、不均衡が過度な状態にある場合は、世界の経済成長にリスクをもたらすため、G20の国々が共同でこの問題に取り組むことが重要である。
- 経常収支不均衡の分析には、貿易収支だけでなく、サービス収支や所得収支も見ることが重要である。また、対外直接投資は安定的な資金を提供することから、資金調達の形態にも注視すべきである。その上で、対外不均衡を解消するには、国内のマクロ経済の不均衡や、企業の過剰貯蓄など構造問題を解消することが不可欠である。柔軟な為替政策は、対外不均衡の調整の一助になりうるが、不均衡の調整程度は、各国の状況により大きく差がある。また、自由で公正な相互に利する貿易体制は非常に重要である。
- こうしたことを鑑み、企業の過剰貯蓄の背景、為替が不均衡を調整する機能等に焦点を当て、国際的な視点から経常収支の不均衡の分析を行うことが必要。

国際的な経常収支の不均衡（1990～2018）（全世界GDP比%）




出典：IMF世界経済見通し、IMF算定

対外資産負債残高（1990-2018）（全世界GDP比%）



出典：Lane and Milesi-Ferretti データセット、IMF世界経済見通し、IMF算定

G20各国経済：経常収支とその構成（各国GDP比%、2018年）



出典：IMF国際金融統計、IMF世界経済見通し、財務省算定

G20 FWG Summary Document on Global Imbalancesⁱ

While global current account imbalances narrowed in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, they remain large and persistent, and stock positions continue to diverge. While some imbalances may be appropriate, others may be excessive reflecting macroeconomic imbalances and structural challenges. It is important for G20 members to jointly address the underlying causes and mitigate the risks arising from excessive imbalances to achieving strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth.



As we have discussed in the past decade as a core mandate of the FWG, reducing excessive imbalances in a growth-friendly manner requires a joint effort by G20 members. Addressing domestic macroeconomic imbalances and structural challenges remains of the essence to reducing external imbalances. Exchange rate flexibility, where feasible, will help support the necessary external adjustments. Further progress toward free, fair, and mutually beneficial goods and services trade will be critical. The joint G20/IMF Spring Meetings Seminar held in Washington D.C. offered a good opportunity for the G20 membership to broaden their perspectives and deepen their understanding of issues relating to global imbalances, while highlighting the need for additional analysis of the underlying drivers of global imbalances both in terms of flows and stocks, including the role of exchange rates in external adjustment, the drivers of corporate saving, and measurement challenges, among others.

Discussion of global imbalances and risks

Global current account deficits and surpluses, as measured against world GDP, have been reduced by over 40 percent from the high levels seen before the global financial crisis. However, they remain high compared to the early 1990s and persistent. Imbalances are increasingly concentrated in advanced economies (AEs), as emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs) have experienced a narrowing in their surpluses or their deficits.

External stock positions have continued to diverge.

According to the IMF, the sum of net creditor and net debtor positions is at a historical peak and four times larger than in the early 1990s. This divergence of stock positions took place against the backdrop of persistent flow imbalances, contributing to an increase in primary income earnings or payments from foreign assets or liabilities respectively. Movements in stock positions have also been influenced by valuation effects in the form of exchange rate and asset price movements. Also, some EMDEs have seen their secondary income strengthen significantly over the years, on the back of strong remittances from their overseas workers. All this, combined with the increasing prominence of the services trade balance in some countries, underscores the importance of monitoring all components of the current account (i.e., balances of trade in goods and services, and income balances), as well as the size and composition of international investment positions, including valuation effects.



Underlying drivers of global imbalances vary across countries, highlighting the need for nuanced and targeted policy recommendations.

Global imbalances reflect a combination of cyclical factors, domestic policies and fundamentals, as well as spillover effects from abroad. Among AEs, the imbalances were generally driven by an asymmetry in demand strength, in part reflecting differences in fiscal policy stances. In addition, rising gross corporate saving also appear to have played a role in some AEs. In EMDEs, the IMF notes


reserve accumulation has become a far less significant driver of current account dynamics since the crisis, with fiscal and credit policies playing a more important role. At the same time, fluctuations in commodity prices continue to have significant implications for current account balances in some countries. Meanwhile, the BIS notes that with growing global financial integration, the impact of exchange rates on the economy through financial channels may have become more important than through traditional trade channels, especially for EMDEs that borrow in foreign currencies. Progress is needed to strengthen external statistics, both in flows and stocks, to correctly assess external positions, especially given the growing role of multinational corporations and global value chains, where the boundaries between residents and non-residents can be blurred.ⁱⁱ

Excess global imbalances can fuel vulnerabilities and risks. FWG members generally agreed that current account surpluses or deficits may be appropriate and in line with economic circumstances—for example, when they reflect the need to accumulate savings to prepare for an increasing pool of retirees in economies with rapidly aging populations (resulting in current account surpluses) or foreign funds flowing to rapidly growing economies with ample investment opportunities (resulting in current account deficits). However, others may also reflect domestic policy settings that lead to macroeconomic and financial vulnerabilities and pose risks.ⁱⁱⁱ Meanwhile the composition of funding sources of the external balance is also important when examining whether global imbalances pose financial stability risks. For example, FDI provides relatively more stable funding than others.

The FWG stressed the need to reduce short- and long-term risks from global imbalances. The increased concentration of deficits in advanced countries lowers near-term financing risks. However, a synchronized global slowdown or increasing policy uncertainties with knock-on effects on commodity prices and global risk aversion could affect the external debt service capacity of some EMDEs, especially those highly reliant on foreign demand and short-term financing denominated in foreign currencies. Over the medium term, a further widening of stock positions could also result in a disruptive adjustment in debtor economies that could spill over to creditor economies and have global and/or regional ramifications. In addition, excessive flow imbalances induced by, for example excessive credit growth and excessively high corporate or precautionary household savings, could put at risk the G20 goal of achieving strong, sustainable, balanced, and inclusive growth.

Joint policy actions

Carefully calibrated macroeconomic and structural policies tailored to specific country circumstances will continue to be important (see Annex). Countries with excessive deficits can help by conducting growth-friendly fiscal consolidation and, where credit is excessive, improving financial sector oversight (including



possibly by tightening macroprudential measures). On the other hand, countries with excessive surpluses can help by making use of available fiscal space to boost potential output, including increasing public investment, and avoiding overreliance on accommodative monetary policies. Well-tailored structural reforms are also critical. For excess deficit countries, reforms that increase competitiveness by enhancing labor market flexibility and strengthening the skill base of workers, while encouraging saving by adjusting pension schemes (including reducing pension generosity) and advancing financial deepening, will help mitigate risks. Many excess surplus countries have scope for reforms that address excessive corporate saving by encouraging investment and further liberalizing trade in goods and services (e.g. removing barriers) as well as reforms that discourage excessive precautionary household savings including by widening the coverage of the social safety net, reducing the labor tax wedge, and further encouraging elderly labor participation. Specific policy actions should be targeted at the identified drivers of imbalances in each country.

Exchange rate flexibility, where feasible, should continue to help support the external adjustment process, although its impacts are likely to vary across countries, especially given their different degree of integration into global value chains and varying compositions of the current account. Ongoing analysis by the IMF suggests that the extent of integration into global value chains and invoicing in dominant currencies may dampen some of the effects especially in the short run. On the other hand, the BIS notes that the role of exchange rates may have changed in an opposite direction from the traditional external adjustment role, especially in EMDEs, as funding availability in dominant currencies became crucial in global economic activities. The composition of funding sources also needs to be carefully monitored. Especially, currency and maturity mismatches may pose risks and limit exchange rate policy options, given the rapid rise in corporate indebtedness in many EMDEs, as suggested by recent BIS research.

Free, fair, and mutually beneficial goods and services trade will support efforts to reduce domestic imbalances, while supporting growth and helping to contain risks of trade policies that distort the level playing field. External imbalances primarily reflect macroeconomic imbalances and structural challenges. In this regard, lower trade costs can foster a more efficient allocation of resources and boost productivity. Therefore, the focus should be on removing barriers and pursuing pro-growth strategies. Promoting trade in services could generate substantial gains, but barriers remain high in certain economies.

The FWG welcomes the primary contributions from the IMF, in line with its mandate, as well as other IOs in analyzing global imbalances. It calls on the IMF to conduct further analysis to help members' understanding of the underlying drivers, including how exchange rates affect the adjustment of the current account and its components, the risks posed by diverging stock positions, and the role of corporate saving in explaining the evolution and persistence of imbalances. Another set of issues that warrants the attention of the FWG members is potential measurement challenges posed by the growth of multinationals and global value chains, and the need to strengthen external statistics to ensure the proper attribution of income from different sources. The analysis should be taken from a global perspective so as to get a consistent and complete picture of the root causes that give rise to excess global imbalances.

ⁱ This document draws on the IMF's background paper on global imbalances, as well as G20 member discussions at 2019 meetings of the G20 Framework Working Group for Strong, Sustainable, Balanced and Inclusive Growth, and the joint G20/IMF Spring Meetings Seminar held in Washington, D.C.

ⁱⁱ The G20 Data Gaps Initiative helps fill in the gaps to some extent, but may not be able to fully address the challenges posed by the growing role of multinationals and global value chains given its specific nature.

ⁱⁱⁱ The IMF estimates that in 2017 about 40 percent of global imbalances were excessive and partly a consequence of undesirable policy settings.

Annex: Overview of joint G20 policy actions to mitigate risks arising from excessive imbalances


Macro Mix	<p data-bbox="761 462 985 502"><i>Excess surplus</i></p> <ul data-bbox="537 510 1164 710" style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="537 510 1164 606">• Use available fiscal space and reorient spending to boost potential.<li data-bbox="537 614 1164 710">• Avoid overreliance on monetary accommodation.	<p data-bbox="1523 462 1747 502"><i>Excess deficit</i></p> <ul data-bbox="1299 510 1845 710" style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="1299 510 1845 606">• Growth-friendly fiscal consolidation.<li data-bbox="1299 614 1845 710">• Tighter macroprudential, where credit excessive.
Structural Policies	<p data-bbox="537 829 940 869"><u>Discourage excess saving</u></p> <ul data-bbox="537 877 1164 973" style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="537 877 1164 925">• Expand social safety nets.<li data-bbox="537 933 1164 973">• Encourage elderly labor participation. <p data-bbox="537 981 918 1021"><u>Encourage investment</u></p> <ul data-bbox="537 1029 1164 1217" style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="537 1029 1164 1125">• Remove entry barriers, especially in services.<li data-bbox="537 1133 1164 1217">• Address drivers of high corporate saving.	<p data-bbox="1299 877 1612 917"><u>Encourage saving</u></p> <ul data-bbox="1299 925 1845 1021" style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="1299 925 1845 973">• Reduce pension generosity.<li data-bbox="1299 981 1845 1021">• Financial deepening. <p data-bbox="1299 1029 1769 1069"><u>Strengthen competitiveness</u></p> <ul data-bbox="1299 1077 1845 1173" style="list-style-type: none"><li data-bbox="1299 1077 1845 1125">• Labor market flexibility.<li data-bbox="1299 1133 1845 1173">• Improve skill base of workers.

高齢化と課題：G20FWGサマリードキュメントの概要

主な内容


- 高齢化はG20の国々が遅かれ早かれ直面する課題であり、今後数十年の間に、すべてのG20の国で高齢化が進むことが予測されている。ほとんどの先進国では高齢化が既に進んでいるが、発展途上国の一部は、依然出生率が高く、労働人口が増加を続けている。しかしながら、そうした国でも将来の高齢化に備える必要がある。
- 高齢化は、労働人口の減少によって経済成長率を押し下げ、社会保障費の増大によって財政収支を悪化させる傾向にある。また、高齢化は実質自然利子率の低下をもたらし、金融政策の政策余地を縮小させ、金融機関の利潤を圧縮する可能性がある。こうした現象は、世代間格差を拡大させるリスクをはらむ。
- 高齢化への対応の鍵は、国際的な波及も含めたマクロ経済への悪影響を最小化しつつ、長寿化による恩恵を最大限に活用することにある。具体的には、女性や健康な高齢者の労働参加、世代間公平性にも配慮した社会保障の確立、金融機関のビジネスモデル適応、金融政策の伝達経路の理解深化、等があげられる。

G20メンバー国の労働人口（15～64歳、10億人）



出典：国連資料を基にIMFが算定。

65歳以上人口の勤労世代（20～64歳）人口に対する比率（%）




出典：各国の資料を基にOECDが算定。


Framework Working Group Summary Document on Macroeconomic Implications of Population Agingⁱ

While population projections are uncertain, G20 economies are expected to age significantly over the coming decades, driven by lower fertility rates and longer life expectancies. The working age population is set to decline, and old-age dependency ratios are expected to increase in all G20 members over the next several decades. There is significant variation in the aging process across the G20, with advanced G20 economies generally in a later stage of the demographic transition. Fertility rates remain relatively high in some Emerging Market Economies (EMEs), with working age population having yet to peak. These EMEs will face the challenge of having to integrate relatively large youth populations into the labour force over the near term while preparing for longer-term demographic transition. They may also face aging-related challenges in the short-term through spillovers from Advanced Economies (AEs).

In the face of population aging, a key challenge will be to leverage the benefits of increased longevity including through international spillovers, and to mitigate negative macroeconomic impacts. In light of the expected aging process, G20 policy makers should be forward-looking and proactive in undertaking beneficial reforms. Appropriate policy responses will depend on each country's existing institutional structure and political economy.



Source: UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, and IMF staff calculations. Area shaded in blue is based on projections.



Source: OECD staff calculations, based on national sources for Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States; Eurostat Population Projections (2008 revision) for France; and UN World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision for China, India, Saudi Arabia and South Africa.

Macroeconomic Implications

Higher longevity is evidence of social, economic and technological progress, but population aging brings with it significant macroeconomic implications. The net impact will depend on the responses of firms, individuals and governments and the interaction of many economic variables. Furthermore, as demographic changes vary across members, so will the macroeconomic implications. Impacts on one economy can also spillover to others. A declining working-age population, as well as a rising proportion of older workers, who may have lower participation rates, will put downward pressure on GDP.

The productivity impact of aging is mixed. A scarcity of workers could incentivize investment in capital substitutes for labour input (e.g. robots) that could raise productivity and lead to capital deepening. On the other hand, although usually more experienced, older workers may be less innovative and entrepreneurial than younger workers. They also tend to shift overall consumption patterns to lower-productivity services.

The impact on savings and investment trends will vary. Overall, the prospect of weaker economic growth due to aging and a declining labour force will likely dampen investment demand. On the other hand, aggregate savings tend to decrease for economies at a late stage of aging and increase for those at an earlier stage. Empirical evidence suggests that population aging has contributed to lower real interest rates

in the past, although the impact may be less certain going forward. Different demographic profiles and institutional frameworks across members will generate different savings and investment patterns.

Population aging can be a factor in cross-border capital flows and current account balances. IMF estimates suggest that in general, capital flows from older-aged to younger-aged countries, and these capital flows can help moderate the effects of aging by channeling capital to where it is most needed and can support global income convergence.

Population aging has implications for monetary policy and financial systems. Potential downward pressure on equilibrium interest rates could reduce the room for conventional monetary policy. Lower interest rates, declining population, lower credit demand, increased risk-aversion, and diversified demand for financial services could drive adjustments in the business models of financial institutions.

Aging-related spending creates fiscal pressure, notably spending on pensions, health, and long-term care, in the context of high debt levels for many members. Including existing reforms, the OECD expects pension expenditures to increase in the majority of G20 members by 2050/60. The IMF estimates that, absent new reforms, the G20 will experience a 6 and 7 percentage point of GDP increase, on average, in age-related public spending by 2050 in EMEs and AEs, respectively, and most of these increases are related to health spending. Given these pressures, the OECD projects that, without any policy changes, tax revenues in advanced G20 countries would have to increase between 4.5 and 11.5 percentage points of GDP by 2060 to keep debt-to-GDP ratios at current levels.

Population aging can exacerbate intra- and inter-generational inequality. For example, pay-as-you go pension regimes can lead to an increased financial burden on younger workers when old-age dependency ratios are rising. Within generations, disadvantages in education, health, employment and earnings can reinforce one another and compound over the lifecycle. In general, people with higher education and income tend to benefit more from increased longevity.

Policy Implications

While uncertain in its scope and speed, population aging will not come as an economic shock; therefore, member policy reforms should be proactive and forward-looking.

Policies to raise labour force participation and productivity can mitigate the impact of aging on GDP. For example, inclusive labour market policies that further boost labour force participation of underrepresented groups such as women, youth, elderly and migrants can help offset the declining share of working-age population. Policies to promote healthy and productive aging are also essential for extending labour force participation over the course of a working lifetime. Support for lifelong learning, retraining, labour mobility and pension portability, flexible work arrangements, retirement policies and the adoption of new technologies can also lessen the impact of aging. Policies to increase competition and innovation, and those that encourage technology diffusion and harness the benefits of technological advances can help lift productivity.

Generating efficiencies in public revenue and spending will be important, particularly spending in health and long-term care for an older population. Properly designed healthcare reforms can reduce pressure on healthcare expenditures while ensuring adequate coverage. An emphasis on healthy aging and promoting health education may also help to curb medical spending in some countries. On the revenue side, tax systems may need to be further reformed so as to better respond to the challenges posed by aging, for example, by broadening the tax base, and strengthening tax compliance.

Reform of pension systems will be central to ensuring the sustainability of public finances, supporting intergenerational equality and reducing old-age poverty. In general, these reforms should allow for flexible work and retirement arrangements with adequate financial incentives. Raising the effective retirement age could encourage higher participation of older workers while maintaining the same pension benefits. One option could be to link the statutory retirement age and pension benefits to life expectancy, including potentially through automatic mechanisms. Unifying pension frameworks across workers and extending them towards non-standard forms of employment may help promote labour mobility across sectors, equality, and economies of scale. Formalization of informal employment can help ensure sufficient pension and health coverage. Delinking pension contributions and employment status may be able to broaden the coverage of social security systems, and promoting complementary private pension schemes can increase pension coverage and fiscal sustainability. Depending on country-specific circumstances, reforms may also be needed to reduce public pension generosity, to secure the sustainability of public finances, and to encourage higher private retirement savings.

Income inequality can impact life expectancy, so the implications of aging for inequality need to be carefully considered in policy design to avoid being potentially regressive.

Governments should be transparent about the fiscal challenges of aging in their medium term frameworks. Publication of longer-term fiscal projections can increase awareness of the impact of aging and build support for challenging policy reforms. Fiscal and social security reforms should be pursued in a predictable manner with sufficient transition periods, and governments need to avoid making commitments based on overly optimistic assumptions and projections.

Monetary policymakers need to better understand the implications of aging for monetary policy. With aging likely to induce lower equilibrium interest rates, potential changes in the strategy and/or the conduct of monetary policy might have to be considered. Also, lessons learned from the use of unconventional policy tools will be important.

Financial authorities could engage with financial institutions to assist their adjustment of business models and services to the aging society. Policies could ease this adjustment and encourage financial institutions to expand age-specific financial services, while being mindful of financial stability implications. Fostering financial literacy could also improve the ability of individuals to make informed financial decisions, helping avoid poverty in retirement.

Labour and capital movements across borders can be mutually beneficial and a risk sharing mechanism between countries. Well-managed international migration can help countries alleviate fiscal pressures associated with rapid aging and provide more time to implement the necessary reforms, and may also raise productivity. Capital flows can help achieve higher returns in economies in a late state of aging while providing the necessary capital in economies in an early stage of aging. Strengthening international/multilateral frameworks and enhancing coordination can help ensure the best outcome for maximizing productivity gains and their spillovers, while minimizing negative impacts.

ⁱ This document draws on the following papers produced for the G20: OECD (2019), Fiscal challenges and inclusive growth in aging societies; IMF (2019), Macroeconomics of Aging and Policy Implications, as well as presentations by the WBG and ILO and G20 member discussions at 2019 meetings of the G20 Framework Working Group for Strong, Sustainable, Balanced and Inclusive Growth and the G20 Symposium held in Tokyo.